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I. INTRODUCTION
Rulings in the Florida state courts, with one exception, raised no major
issues this past year. A number of technical matters were resolved, and the
appeals courts continued the ongoing process of holding trial courts
accountable for the protection of constitutional rights and enforcement of
Florida statutory provisions. The Supreme Court of Florida rendered one
major opinion, however. It held that it was constitutional to close termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings against a challenge by the media that such
hearings should be public. The Florida Legislature was less active than it had
been in recent years, tightening several provisions and making just a few
substantive changes to services in the dependency field and to provisions of
the delinquency law governing delinquent acts.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Mark Earles and Garrett Franzen for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
This article covers cases decided through June 30.
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
In re Gault,' decided thirty-four years ago, requires that juveniles be
provided counsel in delinquency cases and, if indigent, are entitled to an
2attorney paid for by the state. In juvenile law survey articles going back
almost one third of that time, this author has recounted the ongoing failure of
Florida trial courts to comply with Gault.3 In T.S. v. State ,4 a young teenager
pleaded guilty to violation of the City of Orlando's youth protection
ordinance, a curfew, which barred juveniles from certain areas of downtown
Orlando after midnight, and was placed in a Level Eight Facility.5 At the
plea hearing, the child was not represented by counsel and was not informed
of her right to counsel in violation of rule 8.165(a) of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.6 The trial court made a brief comment that it had
explained to the child her rights under the constitution, to which she had
agreed, although the statement did not appear in the transcript.7 There were
written waivers of the right to counsel but they had not been witnessed .
Recognizing that there is a right to counsel at all critical stages of a juvenile
proceeding in Florida,9 the court held that a plea is a critical stage and
warrants the same guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as do trial
proceedings. 10 The court reversed."
In another right-to-counsel case, D.C.W. v. State,12 the child appeared
for arraignment in a delinquency proceeding at which the court gave a
speech to the group of juvenile defendants before him and informed them of
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id.
3. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000
REV. 91, 92 and n.2 (2000).
4. 773 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
5. Id. at 636.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. T.S., 773 So. 2d at 635 (citing A.D. v. State
App. 1999)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 775 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Survey of Florida Law, 25 NovA L.
, 740 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
[Vol. 26:903
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their rights.'3 The appeals court held that the specific colloquy with the
child, to the effect that the child had heard and understood the speech to the
group, was inadequate to meet the requirements of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. The court held that the colloquy about the right to
counsel must include an inquiry into the juvenile's comprehension of the
right to counsel and his capacity to waive the right in an intelligent and
understanding fashion.'5 The issue came up a third time in G.E.F. v. State.'
In that case, at the detention hearing, when asked whether the child wanted
an attorney, the father replied in the negative and the court made no further
inquiry.17 Then at the plea hearing, the only colloquy among the child, the
parent, and the court concerned the court stating that it had offered the child
an attorney, asking whether the parent could afford an attorney, and then
when the mother replied that she could not, the court explaining the right to
a public defender, and the parent decided to waive that right."8 The court
failed to make any further inquiry as required by rule 8.165 of the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which explicitly states what is necessary. The
appeals court reversed. 19
Under Florida law, prior juvenile delinquency adjudications may be
treated as convictions to enhance the classification of a subsequent
delinquency offense charge.' In State v. T.T.,2 a juvenile was charged with
a felony petit theft on the basis of prior convictions.2 In the T.T. case, the
prior delinquency proceedings resulted in withheld delinquency adjudica-
tions and not in convictions, and as a result the juvenile moved to dismiss the
delinquency charge. -  The trial court granted the motion and the First
District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that because there was no express
statutory language that a withheld adjudication may be considered a
conviction for purposes of charging a juvenile in a subsequent delinquency
proceeding as occurs with adults.2
13. Id.
14. Id. at 364 (citing FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.165(b)(2)).
15. Id.
16. 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 2001).
17. Id. at 952.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 985.228(6) (2001).
21. 773 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing FIA. STAT. § 784.03(2) (1999)).
Dale
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Proper application of Florida's risk assessment instrument and other
standards for secure detention have been the subject of discussion in this
survey on a number of occasions.2z The risk assessment instrument is a tool
used by the court to determine whether a child may be held in secure
26 27detention. The issue before the court in J.J. v. Frier arose in the context
of the writ of habeas corpus to overturn a trial court order that a child be
held in secure detention. Florida Statutes provide that the court may order
a placement more restrictive than that demonstrated by the statistical results
of the risk assessment instrument.29 Under those circumstances, the court
shall state its clear and convincing reasons for the placement in writing.30 In
J.J., the appellate court described the pertinent statute as a "departure
provision." The trial court did not state in writing the reasons for exceeding
the risk assessment instrument, and all the appellate court had before it was a
transcript of the detention hearing.32 The appeals court understood the
statutory obligations of the court to be specific and aimed at controlling
juvenile detention.33 Therefore, it could not "casually dispense with the
writing requirement[s]. ' 34  The court added that the statutory provision
required the judge's reasons rather than a statement of evidence. 5 Thus, the
appellate assessment of the reasons given by the judge to validate a variation
from the risk assessment requirement of the statute is not a deferential
review, but rather de novo review.
36
Florida cities, like those in many jurisdictions, have passed juvenile
curfew ordinances.37 The constitutionality of the City of Pinellas Park's
25. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REv. 819,
831-34 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L.
REv. 179, 180-84 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21
NOVA L. REv. 189, 190-93 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida
Law, 20 NOvA L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1995).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213(2)(b)1. (2001).
27. 765 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
28. Id. at 261.
29. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)0) (2001).
30. Id.
31. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 264.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 265.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 266.
37. See Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 3-38-3-41(2000).
[Vol. 26:903
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Juvenile Curfew Ordinance was before the Supreme Court of Florida in T.M.
v. State. 8 The ordinance made it unlawful for a juvenile to be or remain in a
public place or establishment between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the
following day on Sundays through Thursdays and 12:01 a.m. through 6:00
a.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.3 9 The child could be the
subject of a juvenile delinquency petition for violation of the ordinance.40
The supreme court reversed the Second District Court of Appeal without
ruling that the statute was or was not constitutional because the intermediate
appellate court had applied a heightened scrutiny test rather than the strict
scrutiny test.41 The Office of the Attorney General essentially conceded that
the wrong standard was applied and the case was remanded for application
of the strict scrutiny test.42
B. Dispositional Issues
At the close of the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, if the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been
proven, it may either enter an order of adjudication or withhold adjudica-
tion.43 When the court withholds adjudication, it shall place the child on
probation and set additional conditions such as restitution, community
service, curfew, urine monitoring, and driver's license revocation or
suspension, among others." When the court elects to adjudicate a child
delinquent, it may enter a disposition that the child be placed on probation.45
The issue before the appellate court in S.R.A. v. State6 was what length
of probation may be imposed upon a juvenile when the court withholds
adjudication of delinquency.47 The general rule in Florida is once the court
obtains jurisdiction over the juvenile under chapter 985, the court retains
38. 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001).
39. Id. at 442-43.
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 443-44.
42. Id. at 444.
43. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1. (2001).
44. § 985.228(4); FIA. R. Juv. P. 8.1 10(g) (2001).
45. §§ 985.03(43), 985.231. Until recently probation in Florida was known as
community control. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA.
L. REv 91, 96 (2000).
46. 766 So. 2d 277,278 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
47. Id
Dale
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jurisdiction until the child reaches the age of nineteen.48 When the court
adjudicates the child to be delinquent and places the child on probation,
Florida law explicitly limits the term of probation. 49 But for a second-degree
misdemeanor, the statute limits probation to the maximum sentence that
could be imposed if the juvenile were committed to the Department of
Juvenile Justice, which may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment
that an adult could serve for the same offense. 50 However, where adjudica-
tion is withheld, chapter 985 allows an indeterminate probation sentence
until the juvenile turns nineteen.51 Several courts have previously upheld the
statutory provision for indeterminate probation in the withheld adjudication
setting. 2 On the other hand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
53distinction in G.R.A. Deciding that the juvenile justice system area is
remedial in nature, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in S.R.A. upheld the
legislative prerogative, although certifying the conflict with the Fifth District
Court of Appeal.4 The Supreme Court of Florida subsequently approved the
S.R.A. decision without opinion.
55
The general rule in Florida is that the trial court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act
56
until the child reaches the age of nineteen. An exception occurs when the
court enters a disposition in which it commits the child to the Department of
Juvenile Justice when under certain circumstances the term of the commit-
ment shall be until the child is charged by the Department or until he or she
reaches the age of twenty-one.
57
In S.L.K. v. State, the trial court committed the child to a Level Eight
Department of Juvenile Justice program, suspending that commitment until
the child was accepted and completed a Level Six boot camp, and then
48. FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
49. § 985.231(1)(a)l.a.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); N.W. v. State,
736 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) reh'g granted, 744 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1999); M.G.
v. State, 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) overruled by G.R.A. v. State, 688 So.
2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
53. 688 So. 2d at 1027.
54. S.R.A., 766 So. 2d at 280.
55. S.R.A. v. State, 772 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2000).
56. See FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
57. § 985.231(1)(a)(IV)d.3.
58. 776 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
[Vol. 26:903
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retained jurisdiction over the child until he reached the age of twenty-one.59
The appellate court reversed because the Department of Juvenile Justice's
commitment statutory provision allows the retention of jurisdiction in the
event that the commitment extends until the child's twenty-first birthday, but
does not allow the court to continue to retain jurisdiction if the child is
discharged from the commitment prior to the age of twenty-one. 661
F.T. v. State involved an appeal from a delinquency adjudication
where the child was placed on probation. 62 As this section of the article
explains, in general, when a child is placed on probation after a delinquency
adjudication, the maximum sentence cannot exceed that for which an adult
would serve time for the same offense. The issue in F.T. was whether, under
the facts of the case, the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a violation
63
of probation. The child had initially been placed on probation on July 6,
1998.6 The child subsequently admitted a violation of probation and on
February 5, 1999 was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with a
suspended commitment to a Level Four facility.6 5 A second petition for
violation of probation was filed against the child on August 10, 1999 and
amended on September 23, 1999, and a hearing was held on October 7,
1999.66 The issue involved whether, in October 1999, the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider the affidavit of violation of probation.67 The
appellate court held that it did not because the one-year probation term, the
maximum term for the offense had the child been charged as an adult, had
68 69
expired. a Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Florida's juvenile delinquency dispositional statute contains a provision
for dealing with juvenile sex offenders.70 The question in C.C.M. v. State71
was whether the sex offender probation conditions contained in the Florida
Statutes governing adult criminal defendants apply in juvenile delinquency
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1065.
61. 766 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1183.
64. Id. at 1182.
65. Id. at 1182-83.
66. F.T., 766 So. 2d at 1183.
67. l
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See FLA. STAT. § 985.03(31) (2001).
71. 782 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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proceedings.72 C.C.M. involved a thirteen-year-old who was found to have
committed a lewd and lascivious act upon another child. 3 At a review
hearing, after a dispositional hearing at which the child was committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice for placement in a moderate risk residential
program, the court entered a modified order of adjudication and disposition,
imposing the sex offender probation conditions under the adult act.74 The
appellate court reversed, finding first that the adult statute containing
mandatory conditions of probation did not apply to juveniles because it was
silent as to its application to juveniles and because the content of the statute
also referred specifically to adult settings. 75 Although it found that the
statute applied exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, the
appellate court commented in dicta that the lower court might have used its
discretion to impose adult-like conditions.76 However, it could not do so on
a mandatory basis because of the language of the adult probation statute.77
Because the court did not take discretionary authority at the time of the
original disposition, it was foreclosed from doing so at a later date.78
The juvenile delinquency disposition section of chapter 985 of the
Florida Statutes does not provide for what are often described in the adult
system as split sentences, whereby a judge orders commitment but suspends
the commitment and orders completion of a probation program.79 The First
District Court of Appeal recently rejected such an approach in Department
of Juvenile Justice v. K.B.80 In the K.B. case, the trial court ordered that if a
child failed to complete or violated a probation program through the
Tallahassee Marine Institute, the Department of Juvenile Justice would
immediately place the juvenile in a residential commitment facility without
the need for a probation violation proceeding.8' The appellate court
recognized that such an approach was creative, but that it was not available
within chapter 985.82 It then concluded, as other appellate courts have, that
72. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5) (2001).
73. C.C.M. v. State, 782 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 539.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 539-40.
78. C.C.M., 782 So. 2d at 540.
79. FA. STAT. § 985.03 (2001).
80. 784 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.231 (2000)).
8
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trial courts do not have unlimited discretion in establishing dispositions.8 3
They may not place juveniles in particular facilities." That is left to the
discretion of the Department of Juvenile Justice.8
C. Appellate Issues
A technical, but nonetheless important issue of appellate practice, came
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.C.R. v. State.86 The issue
involved preservation of a right to appeal an order by a trial court withhold-
ing adjudication of delinquency but impermissibly placing the child under
"community control for an indeterminate amount of time not to exceed the
child's twenty-first birthday.... ."87 The state conceded that the court lacked
authority to set the term of community control beyond the child's nineteenth
birthday but argued that the issue was not preserved for appeal.88 Florida
law provides that the appeal must be timely and pursuant to the statute
governing criminal appeals and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.89
However, the court concluded that because the sentence imposed in the case
was similar to one that exceeds statutory maximum, it is the type of
fundamental sentencing error that can be raised on appeal without preserva-
tion of rights.90
A second issue relates to the ability of the state to appeal from an order
denying its request to impose restitution liens in a delinquency proceeding.
In State v. M.K.,91 the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction because
"there is no statute or court rule authorizing the state to appeal the
[particular) order at issue." 92 Recognizing that the state's right to appeal is
purely statutory, the court could find nothing in chapter 985's list of orders
that can be appealed by the state which would allow an appeal in the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 784 So. 2d at 557 (citing R.LB. v. State, 693 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)); Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Dep't of HRS v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 91-92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re
K.A.B., 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
86. 785 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id.
89. See FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1) (2001); J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551 n.1.
90. J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551.
91. 786 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 25.
Dale
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particular instance. 93 The court in M.K. then dismissed the appeal after
commenting that the problem had existed in the adult criminal appeal arena
but had been corrected by statute.
94
III.- DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, as it governs dependency proceed-
ings, is not a model of clarity and logic. 95 For example, none of the
subdivisions of the chapter are actually entitled "Dependency Proceed-
ings." 96 The definitional subpart of chapter 39 speaks of a child who is found
to be "dependent" and includes several categories of children.97 They are
children who have been abandoned, abused, or neglected, who have been
surrendered to the Department of Children and Families Services or to a
licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption, who have been
voluntarily placed with a child caring agency or the Department, who have
no parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care, or
who are in substantial risk of imminent abandonment, abuse, or neglect by a
parent or legal custodian.98 These categories of dependent children are then
further defined in the statute, 99 but lacking precision, have been the subject
of appellate review.
An abandoned child is defined in section 39.01(1) of the Florida
Statutes as being in a situation in which the parent or custodian, through his
or her absence, fails to provide for the child's support, fails to communicate
with the child, thus evidencing a willful rejection of parental obligations.'00
The facts must demonstrate to the court a settled purpose not to assume
parental duties.10 Incarceration may constitute abandonment. 02
The issue of how to evaluate abandonment as an evidentiary matter was
recently before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in S.C. v. Department of
93. Id. at 26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1)(b) (2000)).
94. Id. (citing State v. MacLeod, 600 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1992)).
95. C.f. ZJ.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So. 2d 875, 878 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
96. But see Part II of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which is entitled
"Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings."
97. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14) (2001).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. § 39.01(1).
101. Id.
102. Id.
[Vol. 26:903
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Children & Families.10 3 The court recognized that there had to be a showing
of willful rejection of parental responsibilities or marginal efforts to support
and communicate with the child, such that there was a failure to evince the
settled purpose to assume parental duties.1°4 The appellate court's decision,
as one would expect, was fact driven. The court found that there was some
contact between the mother and the child while the child was not in the
mother's physical custody and that the mother did not fail to provide
financial support sufficient to establish abandonment because the husband
and wife were used to supporting the children fully whenever that parent had
custody of the child. °5 There had been no request for support made until the
dependency proceeding was filed by the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle
with whom the child periodically lived.106 The court concluded that the
pattern of conduct in evidence in the case was beneath the statutory
threshold for abandonment.107
Approximately ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,'0 in which it
held that permanent termination of a parent's rights to one child under
circumstances evidencing abuse and neglect may serve as grounds for
termination of parental rights to a different child.10 In M.F. v. Department
of Children & Families,1 the issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was
whether a court may base a final ruling of dependency "solely on the fact
that the parent committed a sex act on a different child." ''1 The court held
that a simple showing by the Department of Children and Family Services
"that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute
proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to
the child's sibling, as required by [Florida law]."" 2 The court recognized
that the act may be quite relevant, but it is not automatically dispositive of
the question of dependency, and therefore the court should focus on all the
103. 767 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. at 582.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id
108. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
109. Id. at 571.
110. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fa. 2000).
111. Id. at 1193.
112. Id. at 1194 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1997)).
Dale
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circumstances surrounding the petition in the particular case.13 The court
thus refused to apply a per se rule.
The application of dependency proceedings to cases involving domestic
violence was before the Fifth District in D.D. v. Department of Children &
Families.14 In that case, the appellate court affirmed an adjudication of
dependency in light of the trial court's finding of what Florida calls
"prospective neglect" based upon proof that the child witnessed multiple
incidents of domestic violence of both a physical and verbal nature, and that
the violence was proof of prospective neglect sufficient to support a
determination even in the absence of medical or other expert testimony.'
5
The appellate court first found that chapter 39's definition of neglect covers
the situation of domestic violence,' 6 and that the state need not wait for a
child to be neglected before instituting dependency proceedings. 1 7 Relying
upon an earlier Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in D.H. v.
Department of Children & Families,"18 the court in D.D. held that the child
must view the acts of violence.1 9 The court then added that the child's
observation must be taken together with evidence indicating that the parents
would more likely than not resume their relationship in the future and thus
resume a cycle of domestic violence in the presence of the child in order to
prove prospective neglect for purposes of a finding of dependency.' °
Finally, the court held that, unlike in the termination of parental rights
setting, 12 the state need not prove in a dependency proceeding that there was
no prospect existing that the parent could improve his or her behavior1
2
The rationale is that there is a different standard of proof in a termination
case than in a dependency case because in the dependency proceeding, the
goal is to improve the parents' behavior for the purpose of reunification in
order to avoid termination.'
3
113. Id.
114. 773 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
115. Id. at 616.
116. Id. at 617; FLA. STAT. § 39.01(45) (2001).
117. Id. at 617.
118. 769 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
119. D.D.,773 So. 2dat 618.
120. Id.
121. See Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. D.D., 773 So. 2d at 618.
123. Id.
[Vol. 26:903
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Corporal punishment periodically forms the basis for a charge of
dependency1 24 In J.C. v. Department of Children & Families,"1 a stepfather
of one child, and father of a younger child, was charged with excessive
parental discipline.126 Noting that the stepfather, while not the biological
father of the older child, was in a position with approval of the mother to
discipline both children, dependency might flow to him.127 The allegations
of dependency were made related to physical, mental, and emotional injury
under chapter 39.128 Florida law allows for corporal discipline so long as it is
not excessive or abusive. 29 The court found that there was no evidence that
the bruises were significant or that they constituted temporary disfigure-
ment. 13  Nor was there any evidence that the children were likely to be
harmed if they were returned to their home.13' Finally, the court referred to
the Supreme Court ruling in Beagle v. Beagle,132 in which the high court, in
the context of grandparent visitation, relied upon the privacy provisions of
the Florida Constitution, which do not allow state involvement unless there
is a threat of harm
133
Florida, like other states, provides that in dependency proceedings,
hearsay statements of a child may be offered to prove abuse or neglect.
1 34
124. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L.
RE.. 91 (2001); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 28 NOVA L. REV.
819 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA L. REV.
179 (1997); Michael . Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NovA L. REv.
189 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
191 (1995). Corporal punishment may also form the basis for a criminal charge. See
generally State v. MacDonald, 785 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 2001); Raiford v. State,
736 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that discipline of a child does not bar
prosecution for simple child abuse if the beating produces severe bruises enough to require
treatment at a hospital).
125. 773 So. 2d. 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
126. Id
127. Id. at 1220-21.
128. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a) (2001).
129. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1221 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a)(4.) (2001)).
130. Id
131. Id. at 1222 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2001)).
132. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
133. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1222. For a discussion of Florida grandparent visitation law,
see Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA LREv. 91, 98-100
(2000).
134. See generally, Michael J. Dale, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 1-38-341
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2001).
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However, under Florida law there must be other corroborative evidence of
the abuse or offense in order for the hearsay to be received in evidence.135 In
R. U. v. Department of Children & Families,136 the court recognized that the
corroborative evidence must tend "to confirm the unlawful sexual act," that
is to say, "the abuse or the offense., 137 The problem with the case at bar was
that the only evidence supporting the child's hearsay statements was other
hearsay statements made by the same child to the same therapist who
testified as to the original declarations.138 These other statements, the court
concluded, do not constitute other corroborating evidence within the
meaning of the Florida statute.1 39 The court concluded that the word "other"
refers to evidence derived from a source other than the child victim's own
statements. 4°
Florida provides by statute that a parent has a right to counsel in a
dependency proceeding.' 4 1 Despite the fact that counsel may be present and
may agree to the parents' consent to an adjudication of dependency of a
child, it is nonetheless incumbent upon the trial court to question the parent
concerning whether he or she understands the nature of the allegations
against him or her and the possible consequences of consent to the
dependency adjudication.' 42  Because the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure so require, 143 the court in LD.M. v. State'4 held that consent by
counsel alone without court colloquy with the mother on these issues was
reversible error. 145
The need to move a dependency case in order that there be timely
disposition and decision about what should happen to the child is contained146
both in Florida law and in federal funding statutes. The need to move
expeditiously was made clear in dicta in A.R. v. Department of Children &
135. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2001).
136. 777 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
137. Id. at 1159.
138. Id. at 1160.
139. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)2.b. (2001)).
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (2001). There is no constitutional right to counsel. See
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30-32 (1981).
142. § 39.013
143. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c) (2001).
144. 779 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
145. Id. at 527.
146. Florida Adoption Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 63.012-63.235 (2001); Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1997).
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Families.147 After ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the
mother's two children were dependent, the court explained that it was
"compelled to explicate a concern presented by this case even though our
reversal is not predicated on the point."'  The court then explained that the
record in the case contained no reason for a nearly eleven-month delay
between the commencement of the dependency hearing and its comple-
tion.' 49  Explaining that the delay was "indefensible" in light of the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake, and given that the legislature had
indicated that proceedings should be handled quickly and that the Supreme
Court had further enunciated time standards, the court concluded "[b]y
publication of this opinion, we hereby advise that delays such as those
involved in this case will not be countenanced."1 50
In K.R. v. Department of Children & Families,'15 the issue was whether
verbal arguments between parents may be sufficient to constitute neglect
within the statutory definition which would be adequate to support an
adjudication of dependency.152 The appellate court concluded that absent
evidence of injury or the risk of injury to the child, there could be no finding
of dependency. Specifically, there was no evidence of psychological
problems, which the child was experiencing, nor any deviation from normal
performance and behavior. 54 Recognizing that arguments are commonplace
and that they can be frequent and loud, verbal abuse between parents alone is
insufficient for state intervention. 
155
On the other hand, failure to protect a child from abuse may constitute
grounds for adjudication of dependency. In M.R. v. Department of Children
& Families Services,156 over a vigorous dissent, the appellate court upheld a
finding of dependency based upon a preponderance of the evidence that the
children had been abused and that the parents had failed to protect them
147. 784 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 623.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 623-24.
151. 784 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
152. Id. at 598. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(43) (2001) (providing that neglect may involve
a significant impairment, an injury which may be defined as "an injury to the intellectual or
psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in
the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.").
153. K.R., 784 So. 2d at 598.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 783 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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from abuse. 157 The evidence was unrebutted that there had been vaginal
penetration of two children. 15 The issue before the court was whether the
father had sexually abused the children. 59 The court held that the evidence
showed that the children had been abused and that the parents had failed to
protect them even though there was no showing as to the cause of the
children's injuries. 6° Judge Jorgenson vehemently dissented stating that
"[b]y its decision today, the court established a new evidentiary standard in
dependency cases: 'if we can't figure out what happened, Dad must have
done it and Mom must have failed to stop it."" The detail of the
concurrence and the dissent demonstrate the factual difficulties that can arise
in intra family dependency proceedings.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida law authorizes nine separate grounds for termination of parental
rights. 62 They include a voluntarily executed written surrender, abandon-
ment, conduct which demonstrates continuing involvement of the parent or
parents in the relationship with the child, which threatens the life, safety,
well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective
of the provision of services,163 the parent is incarcerated under certain
circumstances and for certain times subsequent to an adjudication of
dependency, the filing of a case plan, and continued abuse and neglect or
abandonment, egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or mental or
emotional health of the child or a sibling, subjection of the child to
aggravated child abuse, sexual abuse or battery or chronic abuse, commis-
sion or murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or felonious
assault resulting in bodily injury to the child or another, and finally when
parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been involuntarily termi-
nated.'16 Several of the provisions of the Florida termination law relate to
the development and application of what is known as a "case plan." 16 A
157. Id. at 278.
158. Id. at 279.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 280.
161. M.R., 783 So. 2dat281.
162. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2001).
163. Id.
164. § 39.806(1)(a).
165. § 39.601.
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parent's failure to comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months
can result in termination of parental rights. 
166
The issue before the Third District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. Florida
Department of Children & Families167 was whether a termination of parental
rights petition was prematurely filed because the time period within which
the parents had to comply with the case plan had not passed.161 The Florida
termination statute provides for different case plan compliance time frames
dependent upon which ground for termination is alleged.1 9 Thus, for
example, if it is determined that continuing parent involvement with the
child threatens life, safety, and well-being, there is no requirement for any
particular period of time under a case plan. 17 On the other hand, a separate
section of the law provides that a petition may be filed when the child has
been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed, and the child
continues to be abused and neglected.171 Under those circumstances, there
must be a failure of the parent to substantially comply for a period of twelve
months after adjudication of the child as a dependent child. 172 This time
period begins to run after the disposition. 3 In J.M., the mother argued that
the six-month period had run.174 In fact, the petition was filed under the
section which did not contain a time frame. Under the facts of the. case, no
time frame was required although the case plan contained a six-month
period. The petition for termination of parental rights was filed eight months
later and the court therefore affirmed the termination.
175
A second case involving application of the case plan is ZJ.S. v.
Department of Children & Families. 17 The facts of the case are strange.
The case plan called for a goal of termination of parental rights and then set
forth tasks for the parent to complete which are the type of tasks required to
achieve reunification.1 77 At the same time, according to the appellate court,
no services were offered to the parent to assist in accomplishing any of the
166. § 39.806(1)(e).
167. 762 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2001).
170. Id.
171. § 39.806(I)(e).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. J.M., 762 So. 2d at 1029-30.
175. Id.
176. 787 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 876-77.
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tasks assigned.178  The appellate court reversed because the ground for
termination of parental rights urged by the Department was the failure to
comply with the case plan. The problem was that the section governing
compliance with the case plan deals with a situation where the case plan has
the goal of reunification.179 The Department conceded that it did not offer a
case plan with a goal of reunification with the result that it had to establish
one of the other bases for termination of parental rights. Because it only
sought to terminate parental rights on the basis of the case plan, it could not
meet the standard, and therefore the case was reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. 18
The issue of what to do when a strong bond exists between a parent and
children, but where termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interests, came before the Second District Court of Appeal in D. W. v.
Department of Children and Families.18 1 In that case the trial court upheld
the termination of parental rights, although it recognized that the children
were not likely to be adopted because of their age and special needs. The
court opined that the children's best interests would be served by continued
contact with the father as well as with the biological grandparents. The
appellate court noted that structured contact with the parent is provided by
Florida law. 8 2 The appellate court then remanded in order to allow the trial
court to obtain additional evidence prior to exercising discretion on the
question of future contact between the parent and children as well as the
right of grandparent contact, which is also protected by statute.
18 3
Because termination of parental rights involves such fundamental
interests,184 the process by which the rights are terminated is replete with
protections for the parties. In KS. ex rel. A.S. v. B.C.,185 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of termination of parental rights with
an important concurrence by Judge Sharpe. What disturbed Judge Sharpe
was that the evidence to support the finding of termination was hearsay.
Witnesses who testified lacked first hand knowledge of the facts. Two case
workers said that the parent had refused drug screenings as required by the
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 878.
180. Id.
181. 763 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(7)(b) (2001).
183. D.W.,763 So. 2d at498.
184. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46-47.
185. 766 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
186. Id. at 1225-26 (Sharpe, J., concurring).
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case plans although one refusal had occurred before the case plans were
adopted, and neither worker was able to document any of from the case
file.18 7  Furthermore, the guardian ad litem who had recommended
termination had only seen the child with the parent once and based an
opinion that the parent acted inappropriately with the child upon observa-
tions of the mother's interactions with other children. 188 The court noted that
no hearsay objections were made below and thus the issue was not preserved
for appeal and waived.189 Significantly, in Florida termination cases,
children are not appointed counsel.19° They receive the assistance of
guardians ad litem on an ad hoc basis, and in this case the guardian testified.
Thus, the child had no lawyer. Furthermore, while parents are appointed
lawyers by statute in Florida,191 there is a cap on the amount that lawyers get
paid unless they can convince the court of the need for additional fees.' 92
The issue of whether Florida law, which requires a mandatory closure
of all hearings in termination of parental rights proceedings, violates either
the United States or the Florida Constitution was before the Supreme Court
of Florida in Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children &
Families Services. 93 The case was notorious, involving allegations that the
mother of the child suffered from Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome and
intentionally caused illness to the child involving many hospitalizations.'
94
Initially, at the dependency hearing stage, the parents sought closure of the
proceedings as well as a gag order to prohibit release of information, arguing
that closure was in the best interest of the child.195 The parents then changed
their position at the termination of parental rights stage claiming that the
Florida statute was unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16(a) of
the Florida Constitution. 96 The Court rejected all of the parents' arguments
187. Id. at 1225.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (2001); see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children
in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001).
191. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2001).
192. § 39.0134(2).
193. 780 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2001).
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id
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and found that the statute was constitutional. 197 Judges Anstead and Pariente
dissented.
198
Discovery issues do not appear often in either dependency or
termination of parental rights appellate opinions. However, the ability to
take a deposition did come before the appeals court in S.S. v. Department of
Children & Families Services.'99 In that case, the parents were provided
with discovery, including a witness list as a result of what the court
described as continuing demands for discovery.m On the Wednesday before
a Monday trial, the Department of Children and Families Services filed an
amendment to its discovery response in which it disclosed previously
undisclosed taped statements of the parties as well as adding new witnesses,
including an expert witness.2°t On the morning of trial, the court allowed a
continuance until the early afternoon to take the deposition of the expert.20 2
When counsel for the parent, due to time constraints, only briefly spoke with
the expert, the attorney renewed a motion for a continuance, which was
denied, and the expert then testified.2 °3 Parental rights were then termi-
nated.204 On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that disclosure is required
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure of persons having informa-
tion relevant to the case.205 Furthermore, the court held that while the
juvenile rules do not provide for what is known as a Richardson hearing,206
based upon the Third District Court of Appeal ruling in B.M. v. Department
of Children & Families Services,0 7 if the failure to produce the material is
prejudicial, there must be a reversal. Such was the case in S.S v. Department
of Children & Family Services.20 8
Under Florida law, one of the grounds for termination of parental rights
is when parents are engaged in conduct that demonstrates that continuing
involvement of the parent threatens the life, safety, or well-being of the child
197. Id. at 11 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.467(4), renumbered by § 39.809(4)(200 1)).
198. J.B., 780 So. 2d at 12-17.
199. 784 So. 2d 479.
200. Id. at 479.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 480.
203. Id.
204. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
205. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.245(b)(2)(A) (2001).
206. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480; Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
207. 711 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
208. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
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irrespective of the provisions services. 2 9 In In re C.WW,210 the Second
District Court of Appeal, inter alia, discussed how the state may prove that
continuing involvement of a parent with a child may threaten a child's life,
211safety, or health irrespective of the provision of services. In that case, a
child was born prematurely with the presence of cocaine in its blood-
212
stream. As a result, the state filed a dependency petition and also sought a
judgment terminating parental rights. 3 The appeals court found that the
214trial court's order was not based upon the evidence in the record . It was
premised upon speculation by the trial court that the mother would fail to
215comply with the case plan which had a goal of reunification. The
appellate court held that speculation is not a valid basis for termination of
parental rights.2 6 In addition, there had to be a showing that any provision
of services would be futile or that the child would be threatened with harm
217despite the services provided to the parent. Because the trial court made
no finding and there was no evidence to support its determination,
apparently premised solely on the birth of a drug dependent child, the
218appeals court reversed. It noted further that in every reported Florida case
involving a newborn drug dependent child, there is a finding of a failed
attempt at a case plan or other evidence of abuse or neglect to support a
decision to terminate parental rights.219
V. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Juvenile Delinquency
The legislature added language to the introductory provisions of chapter
985 providing that, among other things, it is the intent of the legislature to
preserve and strengthen a child's family ties. 220 The emotional, legal and
209. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c) (2001).
210. 788 So. 2d 1020 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
211. Id. at 1023.
212. Id. at 1021-22.
213. Id. at 1022.
214. l at 1023.
215. In re C.W.W., 788 So. 2d at 1023.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1025.
219. Id. at 1024.
220. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(7) (2001).
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financial responsibilities of the child's caretaker shall continue while the
child is in the care of the Department of Juvenile Justice.221 Unfortunately,
with the exception of the caretaker's ongoing financial obligations, which
are enforceable against the caretaker,222 the language is simply laudatory and
thus unenforceable.
The legislature added a new paragraph to the definitional language of
chapter 985 providing for a "respite" placement for juveniles "charged with
domestic violence as an alternative to secure detention... when a shelter
bed for a child in need of services or a family in need of services... is
unavailable., 223 The legislature also amended chapter 985 to protect victims
224of youth crime while in school. When the court determines that a victim
or sibling of a victim attends or is eligible to attend the same school as the
child who committed the delinquent offense, the court may enter a no-
contact order in favor of the victim or sibling.= It may alternatively note in
its disposition order that the parents of the victim or sibling do not object to
226the offender attending the same school or riding the same bus.
The legislature passed a complicated scheme for the expunction of
nonjudicial arrest records of a minor who prior to filing the application for
expunction has never been charged with a criminal offense and who has
227successfully completed a pre-arrest diversion program. The child's parent,
or the child, if over eighteen, may file a signed application for expunction on
a form developed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, together with an
official written statement from the State Attorney certifying successful
completion of the program.Y18 The filing fee is $75.00 unless waived by the
executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement Operating Trust
Fund.229 The application must be filed within six months of successfully
completing the program. 23 Whether the parents of children who complete
the diversion can successfully complete this process remains to be seen.
In the programs operations area, the legislature has explicitly authorized
the department to contract with faith-based organizations to provide services
221. Id.
222. See § 985.02.
223. § 985.03(46).
224. § 985.23(1)(d).
225. Id.
226. §§ 985.23(4)(f) (2001), 985.23(1)(d).
227. § 943.0582.
228. § 943.0582(3).
229. § 943.0582(4).
230. § 943.0582(5).
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to children.2 3' It also provided that the Department collect and annually
report cost data for every program it operates or with which it contracts.
Included is the development of a cost effective model for each commitment
program.233 The model shall include an analysis of recidivism rates for each
provider among other kinds of evaluations. This information, if properly
collected and dissimilated, should prove helpful in analyzing dispositional
alternatives.
B. Dependency and Tennination of Parental Rights
As a probable result of legislative bargaining, the legislature introduced
a system which makes mandatory the assessment of every dependent child
eleven years of age or older who has been in licensed foster care and who
has been moved more than once for placement in a licensed residential
facility.235 The procedure, oddly, only applies in Districts Four, Eleven, and
Twelve, and in the "Suncoast Region. The Department of Children and
Families is obligated to report to the legislature every year on December 1st
about this group of children. 2 7 The underlying rationale for the amendment,
at least in part, is the need for this group of children to achieve stability and
pennanency.2 8  The entire approach is subject to the availability of
appropriations. 9 It is also unclear from both the legislative history and
discussions by this author with a legislative staff member to the Senate
Judiciary Committee whether there were any data or studies to support this
legislative initiativemu
Finally, the legislature added language governing adoptions to the
termination of parental rights post-disposition relief section of chapter 39.24
231. FLA. STAT. § 404 (2000).
232. § 985.412(3) (2001).
233. § 985.412(l)(b).
234. Id.
235. § 39.521.
236. § 39.521(5)(a).
237. See § 39.521(5)(e).
238. See § 39.521(5)(b).
239. § 39.521(5)(f).
240. For a study suggesting that foster care and therapeutic foster care are more
desirable and efficient than group/institutional care, see Richard P. Barth, Institutions vs.
Foster Homes: The Empirical Base for a Century of Action, School of Social Work,
University of North Carolina (Feb. 17, 2002).
241. § 39.812. Adoptions are generally covered in chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes.
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The new provision requires adoption petitions to be filed in the circuit in
which the termination of parental rights judgment was entered unless a
motion for a change of venue is granted. u2 The adoption petition may not be
filed until the termination of parental rights judgment becomes final 3. And
the petition must be accompanied by a form containing information about
the child's medical and social history.2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislature made no expansive changes in either the juvenile justice
or child welfare systems. The appellate courts continue the process of
supervision of trial court statutory compliance with chapters 39 and 985. The
intermediate appellate courts have also continued a process of analysis of
unclear statutes. Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida, in a significant
ruling, held that termination of parental rights proceedings are not absolutely
open to the public.
245
242. § 39.812(5).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families Services, 780 So. 2d
6 (Fla. 2001).
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